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The North Carolina Supreme Court Engages in Stealthy Judicial
Legislation: Doe v. Holt
Stealth is defined as "artfully sly action."' When the government
wanted to find a way to fly aircraft over other countries without the air-
craft being detected, it built a stealth bomber: an aircraft that radar
tracking systems cannot detect, even though it is visible to the naked eye.
Similarly, when the Supreme Court of North Carolina wanted to do jus-
tice in a case where a father had raped and sexually molested his two
daughters repeatedly, it created an artfully sly way to legislate judicially.2
Instead of modifying or abolishing the doctrine of parent-child immu-
nity-" 'impermissible judicial legislation' "I in its eyes-the court con-
strued precedent in a manner that would engender the same result. In
Doe v. Holt,4 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the parent-
child immunity doctrine did not bar tort claims arising from a parent's
willful and malicious conduct.' The court stated that this holding was
consistent with the parent-child immunity doctrine as adopted in 1923 in
Small v. Morrison.6 Careful analysis reveals, however, that the court
probably intended the doctrine to bar claims for intentional torts when
the doctrine was adopted in Small.' Thus, in effect, the court's decision
in Holt was not an application of the doctrine as it had been adopted in
1923, but rather a delineation of one more exception to the decaying doc-
trine of parent-child immunity.'
This Note examines the North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in
Holt.9 The Note then recounts the North Carolina judiciary's adoption
and application of the parent-child immunity doctrine since 1923, includ-
ing an analysis of the North Carolina courts' overt resistance to modify-
ing or abolishing the doctrine as it was adopted.10 The Note identifies
1. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 732 (2d concise ed. 1982).
2. Although traditionally judicial legislation has referred to the court's review of stat-
utes, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 761 (5th ed. 1979), this Note recognizes that courts also
think of this term as applying to modification or abolition of judicial doctrines where the legis-
lature has acted in the matter. Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 316 N.C. 489, 494-95, 342 S.E.2d 882,
885-86 (1986); see infra note 145.
3. Doe v. Holt, 332 N.C. 90, 93, 418 S.E.2d 511, 513 (1992) (quoting Lee, 316 N.C. at
494, 342 S.E.2d at 885).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 96, 418 S.E.2d at 514.
6. Id. (referring to Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923)).
7. 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); see infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
8. Exceptions to the doctrine have the effect of allowing a suit.
9. See infra notes 15-48 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 63-128 and accompanying text.
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five factors courts should use when reviewing legislation' and suggests
that courts do not need to defer to legislative inaction.12 The Note en-
courages the North Carolina General Assembly to recognize that the
North Carolina Supreme Court has had to engage in a stealth mission of
judicial legislation to ensure justice."3 The Note concludes that the legis-
lature should either abolish the doctrine of parent-child immunity, or, at
a minimum, make a plain statement about its intent to retain the doc-
trine, clarifying the effect of Holt on the immunity. 4
In Holt, a biological father repeatedly raped and sexually molested
his two unemancipated daughters, with whom he resided, beginning in
1980 when the sisters were five and six years old.15 The abuse continued
for nine years.1 6 The trial court convicted the father after he pled guilty
to criminal charges of second degree rape and second degree sexual of-
fense. 7 While he was in prison, the sisters filed a civil tort action
through their guardian ad litem to recover damages from their father for
their permanent physical and emotional damages. 8
On the theory that the parent-child immunity doctrine would bar
the action, the trial court dismissed the case.' 9 The North Carolina
11. See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 164-91, 195-98 and accompanying text.
15. Holt, 332 N.C. at 92, 418 S.E.2d at 512.
16. Ia
17. Id.
A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the person engages in vaginal inter-
course with another person: (1) By force and against the will of the other person; or
(2) Who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, and the
person performing the act knows or should reasonably know the other person is
mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless. Any person who
commits the offense defined in this section is guilty of a Class D felony.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.3 (1986).
A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the second degree if the person engages in a
sexual act with another person: (1) By force and against the will of the other person;
or (2) Who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, and
the person performing the act knows or should reasonably know the other person is
mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless. Any person who
commits the offense defined in this section is guilty of a Class D felony.
Id. § 14-27.5.
18. Holt, 332 N.C. at 92, 418 S.E.2d at 512. The daughters' complaint alleged that
"[d]uring the period 1980 to 1989 the defendant committed acts toward the minor plaintiffs
constituting assault and battery and intentional infliction of physical, mental and emotional
distress." Plaintiffs' Complaint at 5, Holt (90 CVS 2282).
19. Holt, 332 N.C. at 92, 418 S.E.2d at 512. The doctrine of parent-child immunity gen-
erally prohibits a child from maintaining an action for damages against a parent and vice
versa. See infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
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Court of Appeals, however, reversed the order of the trial court.20 The
court of appeals concluded that the doctrine did not bar the suit for three
reasons. First, neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court had
applied the immunity to civil suits involving criminal actions and "indi-
cations have been that they would not."' 21 Second, the court cited dicta
in other cases stating that the immunity doctrine would not be applicable
where there was a willful and malicious injury of the child.2 2 Finally,
"the father's sexual assaults were so destructive of the family relationship
as 'to eliminate the . . public policy behind the parental immunity
rule.' "23 The father appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals,
holding that the parent-child immunity doctrine, as it has existed in
North Carolina since its judicial adoption in 1923,24 did not bar tort
claims for injuries a parent willfully and maliciously inflicts on uneman-
cipated minors.25 Justice Mitchell, writing for the majority, noted that
the parent-child immunity doctrine was applied first in North Carolina in
Small v. Morrison.26 He cited Lee v. Mowett Sales Co. 27 for the rule pur-
portedly enunciated in Small: "[A]n unemancipated minor child may
not maintain an action based on ordinary negligence against his par-
ents."28 The Holt court then found the father's acts to be both willful
and malicious which, being beyond the bounds of ordinary negligence,
meant that the parent-child immunity doctrine would not shield the fa-
ther from suit.2 9 The court emphasized that its intention was to apply
the doctrine as it has existed since Small until the legislature limits or
abolishes the doctrine.30 The court believed that for it to create an excep-
tion or abolish the doctrine would be "impermissible judicial legisla-
20. Doe v. Holt, 103 N.C. App. 516, 517, 405 S.E.2d 807, 808 (1991), aff'd, 332 N.C. 90,
418 S.E.2d 511 (1992).
21. Id.
22. Id.; see infra note 127 and accompanying text.
23. Holt, 103 N.C. App. at 518, 405 S.E.2d at 808 (citing Wilson v. Wilson, 742 F.2d
1004, 1005 (6th Cir. 1984)). The primary public policy supporting parent-child immunity is
the promotion of family harmony. See infra text accompanying note 52.
24. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
25. Holt, 332 N.C. at 96, 418 S.E.2d at 514.
26. 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923). Small was a negligence suit brought by a child
against his parent. Id. at 578, 118 S.E. at 12; see Holt, 332 N.C. at 92-93, 418 S.E.2d at 512.
27. 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986).
28. Id. at 491, 342 S.E.2d at 884. Lee involved a negligence suit by a child against the
manufacturer of a lawnmower, who in turn sought contribution from the child's father. Id. at
498, 342 S.E.2d at 883; see infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text; Holt, 332 N.C. at 93,
418 S.E.2d at 512.
29. Holt, 332 N.C. at 96, 418 S.E.2d at 514.
30. Id. at 93, 418 S.E.2d at 513.
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tion."'31 Nevertheless, the court realized that equity demanded that the
action be allowed:
It would be unconscionable if children who were injured by hei-
nous acts of their parents such as alleged here should have no
avenue by which to recover damages in redress of those wrongs.
Where a parent has injured his or her child through a willful
and malicious act, any concept of family harmony has been de-
stroyed. Thus, the foremost public purpose supporting the par-
ent-child immunity doctrine is absent .... 32
Attempting to thwart the landslide of cases that this opinion could pre-
cipitate, Justice Mitchell warned that this decision should not be inter-
preted to allow courts to scrutinize the "reasonable chastisement" of a
child.33
Justice Meyer concurred only with the court's judgment, for while
he recognized that "the facts of this case are so egregious that to deny
recovery would border the unconscionable,13 4 he felt that the majority's
holding was not the law of Small as the court declared, but rather a
judicial exception to the parent-child immunity doctrine. 35 He feared the
number of cases that would be "spawned" by the majority's opinion and
questioned how the law delineated by the majority would be applied.36
Justice Meyer attacked the majority's reasoning: "Since the doctrine's
inception, the bench and bar of the state have understood the doctrine of
parent-child immunity to apply to all actions for personal injuries, how-
ever they were caused."'37 According to Justice Meyer, the holding of the
majority was justified not as an application of the doctrine adopted in
Small, but as a court-created exception to the doctrine of parent-child
immunity.3 He further asserted that the legislature is the more appro-
31. Id. at 93, 418 S.E.2d at 512-13.
32. Id. at 96-97, 418 S.E.2d at 514-15.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 98, 418 S.E.2d at 515 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
35. Id. at 98-100, 418 S.E.2d at 516 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
36. Id. at 100, 418 S.E.2d at 516 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
37. Id. at 98, 418 S.E.2d at 515 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
38. "I believe that the majority errs in concluding that it is not recognizing an exception
but simply discovering that the doctrine never applied at all except in cases involving 'ordinary
negligence.'" Id. (Meyer, J., concurring in result). Additionally, Justice Meyer questioned
why, since the court claimed only to be applying the doctrine as it had existed (i.e., only
barring claims of ordinary negligence), the majority inquired into the willful and malicious
nature of the rapes and sexual molestations given that they clearly involved conduct more
egregious than ordinary negligence. Id. (Meyer, J., concurring in result). Justice Meyer felt
that, since the majority specifically "limit[ed] its holding to 'willful and malicious' acts ...
[r]ather than flatly holding the doctrine is inapplicable to all acts... beyond 'ordinary negli-
gence,'" it obviously was creating an exception to the doctrine rather than interpreting it. Id.
(Meyer, J., concurring in result).
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priate government body to address changes in the law that involve public
policy concerns.39
Justice Meyer used a three-pronged argument to establish that the
parent-child immunity doctrine as it existed in North Carolina at the
time of the decision would bar the Holt suit. Initially, he asserted that
the holding of Small v. Morrison was not limited to cases of ordinary
negligence.' "Though the facts in Small involved negligently inflicted
injuries, the Court's reasoning and holding show that the doctrine, as
adopted in North Carolina, is not nearly as narrow."41 Justice Meyer
noted that the Small court cited with approval a case barring the suit of a
minor against her father, who had been convicted of raping her.42 Addi-
tionally, Justice Meyer stated that, in cases since Small, only dicta has
limited the doctrine to cases of ordinary negligence.43 He therefore rea-
soned that since "none of them distinguished or overruled Small,...
none is controlling in this case."'  Finally, Justice Meyer commented
that prior to the decision in Holt, neither appellate court had allowed a
child to recover damages from a parent for infliction of willful and mali-
cious injuries.45
In conclusion, Justice Meyer suggested that it would have been bet-
ter to justify the court's holding as a limited exception to the parent-child
tort immunity doctrine: parent-child immunity should not bar suits by
children against their parents where sexual abuse is alleged,46 and the
standard of proof in such cases should require clear, cogent, and convinc-
ing evidence.47 This limitation would "weed out the truly marginal
cases."
48
American courts created the doctrine of parent-child immunity in a
series of three cases, often referred to as the "great trilogy." 49 The con-
39. Id. (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
40. Id. at 98-99, 418 S.E.2d at 516 (Meyer, J., concurring in result); see infra notes 63-71
and accompanying text.
41. Holt, 332 N.C. at 98, 418 S.E.2d at 516 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
42. Id. at 98-99, 418 S.E.2d at 516 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
43. Id. at 99, 418 S.E.2d at 516 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
44. Id (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
45. Id. (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
46. Id. at 98, 418 S.E.2d at 515 (Meyer, J., concurring in result). Because the legislature
is in a better position to "gauge the wisdom of changing the public policy of the state," and the
decision the court nevertheless felt compelled to render required a change in existing law, the
court should have pronounced the most narrow holding conceivable. Id. (Meyer, J., concur-
ring in result).
47. Id at 100, 418 S.E.2d at 516 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
48. Id (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
49. See Edwin D. Akers & William H. Drummond, Comment, Tort Actions Between
Members of the Family---Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 182 (1961);
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cept of parent-child immunity was first established in 1891 in Hewlett v.
George." The plaintiff sued her mother for wrongful and malicious im-
prisonment in an insane asylum. Justice Woods of the Mississippi
Supreme Court, without citing any authority, held that an unemanci-
pated minor was not entitled to seek civil remedies from her mother's
estate for personal injuries."1 He reasoned that
[t]he peace of society, and of the families composing society,
and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of
families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor
child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to
civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the
parent. 2
Justice Woods concluded that criminal sanctions supplied the only re-
course for such children. 3
Twelve years later, another court followed Justice Woods' lead. The
Supreme Court of Tennessee in McKelvey v. McKelvey54 held that a child
could not maintain a civil action against her father and step-mother for
cruel and inhuman treatment.5" The court did proffer two justifications
for its holding, in addition to the Hewlett precedent: (1) the parents'
right to discipline their child and (2) the related doctrine of inter-spousal
immunity.5 6
In Roller v. Roller, 7 the last case in the trilogy, the Supreme Court
Gail D. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM
L. Rav. 489, 495 (1982); Comment, The "Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to
Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 795, 796 (1976) [hereinafter "Reasonable
Parent"]. The first reference to the "great trilogy" appeared in 1961: "The Hewellette [sic],
McKelvey and Roller cases constitute the great trilogy upon which the American rule of par-
ent-child tort immunity is based." Akers & Drummond, supra, at 182. Since "the courts
recognized early that the broad general rule of immunity as originally stated would very often
produce absurd or unjust results," id. at 217, it is unclear why these authors called these cases
the "great trilogy" and not the "tragic trilogy."
50. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). The regional reporter gives the case name as Hewel-
lete v. George; the spelling of the plaintiff's name in the official state reporter is used through-
out this Note.
51. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
52. Id It is amazing that the justification for a doctrine of such widespread importance is
rooted in this one paragraph!
53. Id.
54. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
55. Id. at 389, 77 S.W. at 664-65.
56. Id. at 390-92, 77 S.W. at 665. At common law, spouses could not sue each other.
Hollister, supra note 49, at 496-97. The wife could not sue her husband because she had no
individual legal identity. Id. ("[Miarriage fused the legal identities of husband and wife.").
The husband, thus, could not sue his wife because in effect he would be suing himself. Id.
57. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905). Roller is cited extensively in Small v. Morrison, 185
N.C. 577, 581-82, 585, 118 S.E. 12, 13-15 (1923).
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of Washington introduced additional justifications for the doctrine: "[I]f
a child should recover a judgment from a parent, in the event of its death
the parent would become heir to the very property which had been
wrested by the law from him.""8 Furthermore, the court noted that a
rule allowing children to sue their parents for damages could jeopardize
the financial welfare of other children in the family. 9
In Roller, as in Holt, a father who had been convicted of raping his
daughter was then sued by her in a civil action for monetary damages.'
The plaintiff argued that
family relations have already been disturbed, and that, by ac-
tion of the father, the minor child has, in reality, been emanci-
pated; that the harmonious relations existing have been
disturbed in so rude a manner that they can never be again
adjusted; and that, therefore, the reason for the rule does not
apply. 61
The court's response unequivocally demonstrated that the parent-child
immunity doctrine barred all tort claims, not just claims based on ordi-
nary negligence:
[I]f it be once established that a child has a right to sue a parent
for a tort, there is no practical line of demarcation which can be
drawn, for the same principle which would allow the action in
the case of a heinous crime, like the one involved in this case,
would allow an action to be brought for any other tort. The
principle permitting the action would be the same. The torts
would be different only in degree.62
The first case in North Carolina to adopt the parent-child immunity
doctrine was Small v. Morrison.63 In Small, the daughter initiated a civil
suit to recover damages from her father for injuries she sustained in a
collision while a passenger in a car he was driving. The plaintiff alleged
that the negligence of each or both of the drivers of the cars involved in
the collision caused plaintiff's injuries.6" The Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that the plaintiff had no right to sue her father in tort.65
The court cited the "great trilogy" to support its holding, noting that
"'[lt is well established that a minor child cannot sue his parent for a
58. Roller, 37 Wash. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
59. Id
60. Id. at 243, 79 P. at 788.
61. Id. at 244, 79 P. at 788.
62. Id. at 244, 79 P. at 789.
63. 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
64. Id. at 578, 118 S.E. at 12.
65. Id. at 579, 118 S.E. at 12-13.
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tort.... And this rule has been applied.., to the most extreme case
possible, that of the ravishment of a minor daughter by her father.' ,66
No authority at common law justified the holding of the court in
Small.67 Furthermore, no statute in North Carolina governed the is-
sue.68 The court insisted at the end of its opinion that the judgment pro-
moted a "sound public policy."'69 Defending its decision, the court stated
that the doctrine "was unmistakably and indelibly carved upon the tab-
lets of Mount Sinai."170 The court never doubted that it was within its
rights to adopt this immunity, even though public policy was involved.71
A review of the cases following the court's decision in Small reveals
the manner in which the court applied the law of parent-child immunity
in practice. In Wright v. Wright 72 the defendant-employer sought to ex-
tend the protections of the doctrine by alleging that it barred a suit be-
tween a child and his father's employer.73 Plaintiff, a passenger in his
father's taxicab, was injured because of his father's negligence.74 The
child sued the owner of the taxicab service.75 The North Carolina
Supreme Court allowed recovery: "The personal immunity from suit be-
cause of the domestic relation does not extend to the employer so as to
cancel his liability or defeat recovery on the principle respondeat superior
when the injury was inflicted by the servant acting as such."' 76 The court
66. Id. at 579-80, 118 S.E. at 13 (quoting 20 RULING CASE LAW § 36, at 631 (William M.
McKinney et al. eds., 1929) (citation omitted)).
67. The reasons the court in Small did not allow the action include the lack of authority
at common law that would have supported a damage recovery. Id. at 586, 118 S.E. at 16.
However, other writers have suggested that common law did not disallow the action either.
See, eg., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at
904 (5th ed. 1984) ("[T]here is no good reason to think that the English law would not permit
actions for personal torts."); "Reasonable Parent," supra note 49, at 796 n.4 ("There appear to
be no early English cases which consider parental immunity. The early American and English
commentators are in conflict as to whether the parent should be liable for torts inflicted upon
his child.").
68. Small, 185 N.C. at 586, 118 S.E. at 16.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. However, Justice Clark strenuously dissented from the majority's adoption of the doc-
trine of parent-child immunity. Id. at 588-604, 118 S.E. at 17-25 (Clark, J., dissenting). He
asserted that the legislature was the appropriate body to enact such a law because the doctrine
was based on public policy and not common law. Id. at 598, 602, 118 S.E. at 22, 24 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). "The courts should not create law to exclude [children] from justice when there
has been a legal wrong." Id. at 602, 118 S.E. at 25 (Clark, J., dissenting).
72. 229 N.C. 503, 50 S.E.2d 540 (1948).
73. Id. at 507, 50 S.E.2d at 543.
74. Id at 504, 50 S.E.2d at 541. "The child was not a paid passenger. The complaint
describes him as an invitee, with the knowledge and consent of the defendant owner." Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 507-08, 50 S.E.2d at 544.
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noted that its decision not to expand the doctrine as it had been adopted
conformed to the "better reasoned view" and "sound public policy.""
In Redding v. Redding,78 a case factually analogous to Small v. Mor-
rison, the plaintiff asked the court to modify or abolish the doctrine of
parent-child immunity.79 The plaintiff-son alleged that the defendant-
father's negligence caused an automobile accident that resulted in per-
sonal injuries to the plaintiff.80 Although the court adhered to its deci-
sion in Small and barred plaintiff's suit, the court acknowledged that
other jurisdictions had begun to reevaluate the doctrine."1 The court rec-
ognized that some jurisdictions had limited the doctrine of parent-child
immunity by creating an exception for willful or malicious torts.8 2
The Redding court did not adopt such a limitation, however, and
several cases that followed extended the reach of the doctrine. For in-
stance, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in Lewis v. Farm Bureau
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.83 that the estate of an unemancipated
child could not maintain an action against his mother for wrongful death
caused by her ordinary negligence. The court reasoned that, if the child
had lived, the doctrine of parent-child immunity would have barred a
civil action for damages.84 Later, in Gillikin v. Burbage,5 the North
Carolina Supreme Court recognized, in an expansive application of the
rule adopted in Small, that parent-child immunity is reciprocal-chil-
dren cannot sue their parents and parents cannot sue their children. 6
The court also broadly delineated the public policies embodied in the
doctrine: "family unity, domestic serenity, and parental discipline." 7
This trend of expanding the doctrine continued in Watson v. Nichols.88
In Watson, the persons the child sued were not allowed to file a cross-
action against the child's parents for primary and ordinary negligence or
contribution, since the effect of allowing such an action would be to make
the parents indirectly liable to the child, which is not allowed under the
77. Id at 509, 50 S.E.2d at 544.
78. 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952).
79. Id at 639, 70 S.E.2d at 677.
80. Id. at 638-39, 70 S.E.2d at 676.
81. Id. at 639-40, 70 S.E.2d at 677.
82. Id. at 640, 70 S.E.2d at 677.
83. 243 N.C. 55, 89 S.E.2d 788 (1955).
84. Id. at 56-57, 89 S.E.2d at 789.
85. 263 N.C. 317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1965).
86. Id at 321, 139 S.E.2d at 757. Plaintiff, the mother of the defendant, brought a civil
action for personal injuries sustained when "she was struck by the door of defendant's automo-
bile." Id. at 318, 139 S.E.2d at 755.
87. Id. at 321, 139 S.E.2d at 757.
88. 270 N.C. 733, 155 S.E.2d 154 (1967).
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doctrine of parent-child immunity. 9
In 1972, the Supreme Court of North Carolina again considered
abolishing the doctrine.90 In Skinner v. Whitley,91 the court reexamined
the doctrine, 92 reevaluated the validity of the public policies behind it,93
and took notice of the status of the doctrine in other jurisdictions.94 In
this case, the plaintiff administrator of a deceased child's estate sought to
sue the deceased parent's estate for wrongful death caused by the negli-
gence of the parent while driving a motor vehicle. 95 Although the court
refused to recognize this exception to the doctrine of parent-child immu-
nity, it did note that "a growing minority of states have reexamined and
modified the doctrine. Such modifications are expressed as exceptions to
the immunity rule." 96 The Skinner Court recognized that one exception
had previously been adopted in North Carolina: Where a parent, acting
in his capacity as an employee, injures his child, the child may assert a
claim against the employer.97
Declining to limit or abolish the doctrine of parent-child immunity,
the Skinner court made several statements about the propriety of judicial
assessment of public policy.98 These observations have since limited the
court's application of the doctrine of parent-child immunity in North
Carolina. Initially, the court stated that
total abrogation of the immunity rule would lead to judicial
supervision over the conduct of parent and child in the ordi-
89. Id at 735, 155 S.E.2d at 156. In Watson, the plaintiff-child sued the parents of an-
other child for their negligence in allowing their son to operate a power lawnmower. Id. at
735, 155 S.E.2d at 155. Plaintiff suffered injuries when the defendants' son backed the power
lawnmower over plaintiff's foot. Id.
90. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
91. 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972).
92. Id at 479-80, 189 S.E.2d at 232.
93. Id. at 480, 189 S.E.2d at 232-33. The court listed five policy reasons for the doctrine:
(1) domestic serenity, (2) danger of fraud and collusion among parents and children to obtain
insurance proceeds, (3) depletion of family funds, (4) "the possibility of inheritance, by the
parent, of the amount recovered in damages by the child," and (5) parents' rights to control
and discipline their children. Id.
94. Id. at 480, 189 S.E.2d at 233.
95. Id. at 476-77, 189 S.E.2d at 231; see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
96. Skinner, 281 N.C. at 481, 189 S.E.2d at 233. The court noted several exceptions,
Suits are allowed where death terminates the parent-child relationship, where there is outra-
geous conduct on the part of the parent that invades the child's rights, or where there is willful
and intentional injury of the child. Id. Furthermore, "[w]here a dual relationship exist[ed]
between parent and child, such as master and servant or carrier and passenger, the domestic
relationship has been described as merely incidental, affording no immunity." Id. Finally,
where the parent was acting in the scope of his employment, the doctrine would not bar a suit
by the child against the employer. Id.
97. Id. at 481-82, 189 S.E.2d at 233; see supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
98. Skinner, 281 N.C. at 484, 189 S.E.2d at 235.
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nary operation of the household. This should never be done so
long as the law imposes on the parents the duty and obligation
to support, control and discipline their children.99
Declaring that "piecemeal abrogation" by the judiciary was imprudent,
the court then noted that in any event it still believed that the public
policy considerations discussed in Small v. Morrison outweighed argu-
ments for change in cases involving ordinary negligence. °° The court
next explained that changes in the established law should be effectuated
by the General Assembly because the easiest way to change a law is by
statute and "'question[s] of public policy [are] to be determined by the
legislature and not by the court.' "101 The court did, however, reserve
the right in dicta to refuse to apply the doctrine in any future case involv-
ing an "intentional, willful or malicious tort inflicted on a child."1 °2
In 1975, the General Assembly partially responded to the court's
plea by passing North Carolina General Statutes Section 1-539.21, which
allows a child to sue his parent in tort "for personal injury or property
damage arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle owned or operated
by such parent." ' 3 In Ledwell v. Berry,"°4 this statute survived an equal
protection challenge that arose because the statute abolished the parent's
immunity but not the child's.105
In Snow v. Nixon,1"6 the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed
the scope of the motor vehicle exception created by the statute. In this
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting 3 ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 248, at 179 (3d
ed. 1963)).
102. Id.
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (1983).
104. 39 N.C. App. 224, 249 S.E.2d 862 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 585, 254 S.E.2d
35 (1979). In Ledwell, the mother sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 224, 249 S.E.2d at 863. In a separate action, the minor defendant fied an
action against his mother for personal injuries he sustained as a result of her negligent opera-
tion of a motor vehicle. Id. In that action, the mother was barred from pleading the doctrine
of parent-child immunity because of § 1-539.21. Id.
105. Id. at 225-26, 249 S.E.2d at 863-64. The court held that the law had "a reasonable
relation to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose," id. at 225, 249 S.E.2d at 863, and
was based upon a "reasonable distinction" that "[plarents have the right and duty to train and
control unemancipated minor children." Id. at 226, 249 S.E.2d at 864. Furthermore, in dicta,
the court noted that the removal of an immunity by the legislature is within the state's police
powers. Id. Subsequently, in Allen v. Allen, 76 N.C. App. 504, 333 S.E.2d 530, disc rev.
denied, 315 N.C. 182, 337 S.E.2d 855 (1985), the court of appeals held that the statute did not
violate a parent's right to substantive due process because it did not deprive her of a right to
which she was otherwise entitled. Id. at 506, 333 S.E.2d at 532. The court reasoned that prior
to the enactment of the statute, the mother did not have a right to maintain a suit against her
child because of the doctrine of parent-child immunity. Id.
106. 52 N.C. App. 131, 277 S.E.2d 850 (1981).
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case, the child suffered injuries when she darted in front of the defend-
ant's car, after alighting from the vehicle driven by her mother. The
daughter sued the driver of the other car, who in turn initiated a third-
party complaint for contribution from the plaintiff's mother.10 7 The
court of appeals held that the statute applied so that the doctrine of par-
ent-child immunity did not bar the defendant's claim against the
mother.108 Not only did the court announce an expansive holding, but
its reasoning evinced a very liberal interpretation of the statute. The
court stated that the statute applied to the facts in this case because the
injuries sustained by the daughter arose out of the mother's operation of
a motor vehicle.' °9
The North Carolina Supreme Court further enlarged the scope of
the statute in Carver v. Carver,110 which involved a suit for wrongful
death by the estate of a deceased two-month old child against his
mother.1 1 The child died in a car accident caused by his mother's negli-
gence.1 12 The supreme court held that, because the exception to parent-
child immunity created by the statute would not have barred a personal
injury action brought by the child had he lived, "it likewise does not bar
this wrongful death action brought by his estate."' 13
In Coffey v. Coffey,114 a mother filed a complaint against her son,
"alleging that she sustained injuries as a result of [his] negligent opera-
tion of an automobile.., in which [she] was a passenger.""'  The North
Carolina Court of Appeals considered whether the statute abolished a
child's immunity," 6 and decided it did not.' 17 Eleven days after this
decision, the General Assembly amended the statute 18 to abolish a
107. Id. at 131-32, 277 S.E.2d at 850.
108. Id. at 135, 277 S.E.2d at 853.
109. Id. at 134-35, 277 S.E.2d at 852.
110. 310 N.C. 669, 314 S.E.2d 739 (1984).
111. Id at 671, 314 S.E.2d at 740-41.
112. Id
113. Id at 673, 314 S.E.2d at 742. The court relied in part on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-
2 (1984 & Supp. 1991), which authorizes wrongful death actions when the injured person, had
he lived, would have been entitled to sue for damages. Carver, 310 N.C. at 674, 314 S.E.2d at
741-42. Justice Meyer, who dissented in Carver, stated that the statute should "not be ex-
tended by judicial fiat to wrongful death actions. If the legislature chooses to do so, it may
express its intent and will to so extend the statute by appropriate legislation." Id. at 686, 314
S.E.2d at 749 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
114. 94 N.C. App. 717, 381 S.E.2d 467 (1989), disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 326 N.C.
586, 391 S.E.2d 40 (1990) (per curiam).
115. Id. at 718, 381 S.E.2d at 468.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 719, 381 S.E.2d at 469.
118. Harlin R. Dean, Jr., Note, It's Time to Abolish North Carolina's Parent-Child Immu-
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child's immunity in motor vehicle cases and to allow recovery for wrong-
ful death.1 19 Obviously, this amendment broadened the initial exception
created by the legislature. Although the legislature created an exception
to the parent-child immunity doctrine as it pertained to motor vehicle
cases, it did not modify or abrogate the doctrine in any other respects. 120
In Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 2' the North Carolina Supreme Court
again considered abolishment of the doctrine.122 In Lee, a lawn mower
driven by the child's father came into contact with her foot, injuring the
child. 123 She sued the manufacturer of the lawnmower, who sought con-
tribution from her father, claiming he was negligent.124 The court did
not allow the third party plaintiff's action.1 25
In reviewing the application of the doctrine over the years, the court
stated, "The Small decision enunciated the rule that an unemancipated
minor child may not maintain an action based on ordinary negligence
against his parents." 126 In dicta, the court stated that the doctrine did
not bar actions for willful and malicious acts.1 27 The court nevertheless
refused to abolish the doctrine because
[t]o judicially abolish the parent-child immunity doctrine after
the legislature has considered and retained the doctrine would
be to engage in impermissible judicial legislation. If the doc-
trine is to be abolished at this late date, it should be done by
legislation and not by the Court.... The doctrine will continue
to be applied as it now exists in North Carolina until it is abol-
ished or amended by the legislature. 128
nity, But Who's Going to Do It? - Coffey v. Coffey and North Carolina General Statutes Sec-
tion 1-539.21, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1317, 1318 (1990).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Supp. 1992) provides, "The relationship of parent and
child shall not bar the right of action by a person or his estate against his parent or child for
wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage arising out of operation of a motor vehi-
cle owned or operated by the parent or child." Id.
120. See Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 316 N.C. 489, 494-95, 342 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1986) (rec-
ognizing the limited extent of legislative modification of the doctrine).
121. 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986).
122. Id. at 489-91, 342 S.E.2d at 882-83.
123. Id. at 490, 342 S.E.2d at 883.
124. Id. at 489, 342 S.E.2d at 883.
125. Id. at 490, 342 S.E.2d at 883.
126. Id. at 491, 342 S.E.2d at 884. The court, however, cited for this proposition Redding
v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952), in which the court noted that other jurisdic-
tions had created exceptions to the doctrine of parent-child immunity for willful and malicious
actions. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
127. Lee, 316 N.C. at 492, 342 S.E.2d at 884 (citing 3 ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA
FAMILY LAW § 248, at 297 (4th ed. 1981)).
128. Id. at 494-95, 342 S.E.2d at 885-86. Justices Exum and Martin each dissented sepa-
rately. See id. at 496-97, 342 S.E.2d at 886 (Exum, J., dissenting); id. at 495-96, 342 S.E.2d at
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This directive heavily impacted the North Carolina Supreme
Court's ruling in Holt. The court's options were restricted because (1)
the court was precluded from making an exception to the doctrine of
parent-child immunity and from abolishing the doctrine because the
court had stated in earlier cases that either action would be "impermissi-
ble judicial legislation,"129 and (2) equitable concerns precluded the court
from recognizing that the doctrine as adopted in Small v. Morrison
barred all tort actions because then the action in the instant case would
not be allowable. Limited in these respects, the court adhered to dicta in
Lee v. Mowett Sales Co. supporting the notion that Small v. Morrison
applied only to bar suits involving ordinary negligence.1 30 The court
concluded that the father's acts of rape and sexual molestation were will-
ful and malicious, thus exceeding the ordinary negligence immunity stan-
dard. 131 What will be the effect of the court's holding? Does it matter
that the court did not simply create an express exception for willful and
malicious acts?
132
The majority's holding, which was more expansive than an excep-
tion could have been, concerned Justice Meyer.133 His concerns provide
a useful roadmap for analyzing how courts should interpret and apply
the holding of Holt.1 34 Is it limited to cases of sexual abuse? Should the
standard of proof required in such cases be raised to clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence? In light of the majority's statement on reasonable
chastisement, where should the line be drawn between discipline and
willful and malicious acts of physical abuse? Would the majority simi-
886-87 (Martin, J., dissenting). "Where this Court has established a precedent, as in Small V.
Morrison, which deprives a recognized segment of society of its just rights, it should not hesi-
tate to remedy its own wrongs. Such is not judicial legislation, but judicial enlightenment."
Id. at 496, 342 S.E.2d at 887 (Martin, L, dissenting).
129. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
132. The daughter's lawyer noted that the supreme court's holding goes farther than the
court of appeals:
The difference is that the Appeals Court said under the facts of this case there is a
cause of action .... The Supreme Court said children may sue in all cases of willful
and malicious conduct. That's a big difference. For example, if a child receives a
severe whipping that is injurious, that may be grounds for relief.
Parental Immunity Is Limited, N.C. LAW. WKLY., July 27, 1992, at 1, 3. This illustrates just
how expansively the court's holding may be read.
133. Holt, 332 N.C. at 100, 418 S.E.2d at 516 (Meyer, J., concurring in result). There is a
fine distinction between creating an exception to an established body of case law and constru-
ing precedent in a manner that reaches the same result. The distinction involves a difference in
methodology, since in both cases the court runs the risk of upsetting expectations. An excep-
tion, however, may be more clearly defined, thus promoting stability in the law.
134. See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
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larly apply the law on facts alleging only gross negligence since this too
would exceed the protected arena of ordinary negligence?
After Holt, only two things are clear: (1) Acts of ordinary negli-
gence are still protected by the parent-child immunity doctrine, and (2)
in suits involving sexual abuse, the court will allow recovery because
these acts, unlike acts of ordinary negligence, are willful and malicious.
Instead of muddying the waters of parent-child immunity, Holt could
have been a watershed case either abolishing the doctrine or creating a
clearly enunciated exception to the doctrine's general rule of immunity.
Why was it neither?
The court's earlier statements regarding the propriety of judicial leg-
islation, interpreted as being either modification or abolition of the doc-
trine, restricted the court's reasoning. The court's fears of judicial
legislation may have resulted from the stigma associated with "lochneriz-
ing." This term is a byword that applies when "judges substitute their
policy preferences for those of the legislature." '35 In Holt, Justice Mitch-
ell, writing for the majority, expressly stated that this was his concern:
"'[T]o judicially abolish the parent-child immunity after the legislature
has considered and retained the doctrine would be to engage in imper-
missible judicial legislation.' "136
135. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
LIFE 124-25 (1988). The term "lochnerizing" is derived from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905), in which the United States Supreme Court struck down a state law that limited the
number of hours men could work per week. WIECEK, supra, at 124.
Put simply, the problem is: how can an institution that is not at all democratic in its
composition and methods legitimately exercise the power of holding void the laws
enacted by the democratically elected branch of government, the people's representa-
tives? This question of legitimacy has provoked another: can Supreme Court adjudi-
cation be objective? ... [Clan its decision be defended by reference to criteria of
judgment external to the judges' personal political, social, economic, religious, and
ideological preferences? Or is appellate judging really nothing more, in the end, than
the judges substituting their own views about desirable social policy for those of the
people's representatives?
Id. at 1.
136. Holt, 332 N.C. at 93, 418 S.E.2d at 513 (quoting Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 316 N.C.
489, 494, 342 S.E.2d 882, 883 (1986)). In Lee, the North Carolina Supreme Court noted that
after its Watson and Skinner decisions, the legislature "carved out only a single exception in-
volving a child's personal injuries resulting from a parent's operation of a motor vehicle....
[T]he legislature otherwise left the parent-child immunity doctrine intact .. " Lee, 316 N.C.
at 494, 342 S.E.2d at 885. The supreme court assumed that the legislature reviewed the entire
doctrine and decided to retain it, except for the motor vehicle exception. Id. The court made
this assumption because it thought it would be unreasonable for the legislature to leave such an
important matter "open to speculation." Id. at 494-95, 342 S.E.2d at 886. It seems equally as
probable, however, that the legislature only considered this one exception to the doctrine.
"The legislative action may have resulted in part from a recognition of the compulsory nature
of modern automobile liability insurance statutes." Id. at 493, 342 S.E.2d at 885. Even if the
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Initially, it must be realized that the legitimacy of judicial review is
being reestablished.1 37 As long as the justices are not merely imposing
their will over that of the legislature, the court can avoid the stigma of
"lochnerizing." 138 Five factors should guide a court's exercise of judicial
review: the text of the federal and state constitutions and applicable stat-
utes, the legislative history, the structure of and relationship between
branches of government as created by the constitution, judicial prece-
dent, and "the basic values that underlie our society."' 139 These factors
provide internal restraints on judicial review.4°
Furthermore, the North Carolina Supreme Court previously has
stated:
The Courts of this State have no inherent power to review acts
of the General Assembly and to declare invalid those which the
Courts disapprove of or, upon their own initiative, find to be in
conflict with the Constitution. The Courts and the Legislature
are coordinate branches of the State government and neither is
superior to the other. 141
But in Holt, the court was not asked to assess the constitutionality or the
propriety of a statute.1 42
The legislature has acted only twice to further the development of
the judicial doctrine of parent-child immunity in North Carolina: the
passage and amendment of North Carolina General Statutes Section 1-
539.21.143 Neither act of the General Assembly was at issue in Holt, and
the appellate courts of North Carolina previously had upheld the consti-
tutionality of this statute.1" Because there is no evidence that the Gen-
eral Assembly considered altering the doctrine in any respect other than
that addressed by Section 1-539.21 of the North Carolina General Stat-
utes, or that it considered complete abrogation, the court should not be
precluded from evaluating the merits of alteration or abolition of the doc-
legislature had considered the entire doctrine and decided to retain it, the court did not have to
defer to this inaction. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
137. See generally WiECEK, supra note 135, at 188 (stating that the agenda for modem
debate is "[h]ow to legitimate judicial review and set the proper bounds for its scope").
138. Id. at 191.
139. Id. at 185-87. Here, the five criteria for judgment that Wiecek suggests should guide
justices in their review of a statute, as they have been couched in terms that should make them
useful to state court judges.
140. Id. at 185.
141. Green v. Eure, 27 N.C. App. 605, 608, 220 S.E.2d 102, 104 (1975).
142. Rather the plaintiffs only asked the court to allow them to maintain a suit against
their father for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See supra
note 18 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 103-20 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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trine. 145  "North Carolina courts have altered judicially-created com-
mon-law rules with public policy ramifications on numerous occasions.
Thus, the supreme court's deference to the General Assembly on the is-
sue of parental immunity is not mandated by judicial precedent."' 146
In summary, if the court is assessing the constitutionality of a stat-
ute, the statute should be presumed valid 47 and five factors-text, legis-
lative history, structure of government, judicial precedent, and societal
values-should then guide the court's assessment.' 41 If the court is as-
sessing the propriety or constitutionality of a doctrine previously adopted
by the courts, however, even if the legislature has reviewed the doctrine
and decided not to act on the matter, then the court may amend or abol-
ish the doctrine without deferring to the legislature's inaction. 49
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has been forced to engage in
a stealthy mission of judicial legislation to ensure justice because of (1)
the General Assembly's inaction in stating its view on the appropriate
role of the doctrine of parent-child immunity in North Carolina, (2) the
judiciary's assumption that the legislature's single exception to the doc-
trine for motor vehicle cases could be interpreted as a retention of the
doctrine generally, and (3) the judiciary's assumption that any future ju-
dicial modification of the doctrine would constitute "impermissible judi-
cial legislation." The court's decision in Holt is an example of such
145. At least one court has completely rejected the policy of not overruling past decisions
where the legislature had acted in the matter. See Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26,
36-39, 115 N.W.2d 618, 623-25 (1962). The court in Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122
N.W.2d 193 (1963), held "that it was our responsibility to change a court-made rule of law
when we deemed the change necessary in the interests of justice even though the legislature
had refused to make the change." Id. at 412, 122 N.W.2d at 198 (paraphrasing the holding in
Holytz). In Goller, the Wisconsin Supreme Court abolished the parent-child immunity doc-
trine, except in two situations, even though the Wisconsin legislature had rejected a bill that
would also have abolished the immunity. Id.; see infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
The New Jersey Supreme Court approached this problem in a slightly different fashion. It
reasoned that it was free to amend or abolish immunity doctrines anywhere a legislative statute
had not positively granted the immunity. Foldi v. Jeffries, 93 N.J. 533, 544-45, 461 A.2d 1145,
1151 (1983). Thus, since there was not a legislative mandate guaranteeing parental immunity,
the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that it was free to weigh the competing policy issues
and abrogate or abolish the doctrine as it deemed appropriate. Id.
146. Beth A. Falk, Note, Lee v. Mowett Sales Co.: North Carolina Retains Its Partial
Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine, 65 N.C. L. Rlv. 1457, 1472-73 (1987) (footnote omitted).
147. See Martin v. Housing Corp., 277 N.C. 29,41, 175 S.E.2d 665, 671 (1970) ("When the
constitutionality of a statute is challenged, 'every presumption is to be indulged in favor of its
validity.'" (quoting State v. Lueders, 214 N.C. 558, 561, 200 S.E. 22, 24 (1938))).
148. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
149. Since the legislature functions as the final decision maker regarding public policy in a
state, this type of decision could be overruled by a subsequently enacted statute. See Allen v.
Allen, 76 N.C. App. 504, 507, 333 S.E.2d 530, 533, disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 182, 337 S.E.2d
855 (1985) (stating that issues of public policy are for the legislature to decide).
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stealth. Because of the effect of the court's treatment of precedent in
Holt, the case easily can be interpreted as an act of judicial legislation,
though the court neither expressly created an exception to the doctrine of
parent-child immunity nor abolished the doctrine.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Small v. Morrison held
that a child did not have a right to sue her father in tort. 150 Small relied
in part on Roller v. Roller, a case that did not allow a daughter to recover
damages from her father who had raped her. 51 Two factors suggest that
the Small court did not intend its holding to be limited to actions of
ordinary negligence: (1) the court's reliance on Roller, and (2) the
court's inclusion of a quote stating that the doctrine of parent-child im-
munity barred even "the most extreme case possible, that of the ravish-
ment of a minor daughter by her father." '152 Since Small distinguished
neither Roller nor the quote, it is likely that the court intended the doc-
trine of parent-child immunity to bar actions for intentional torts as well
as for those negligently inflicted. Seemingly, a court would not cite
sources, without distinguishing them, unless it intended to adopt the pro-
positions asserted by the sources.
Subsequent court opinions and comments by many writers support
Justice Meyer's assertion in Holt that "[s]ince the doctrine's inception,
the bench and the bar of the state have understood the doctrine of par-
ent-child immunity to apply to all actions for personal injuries, however
they were caused." '53 For instance, in 1948, the North Carolina
Supreme Court in Wright v. Wright assessed whether the doctrine of par-
ent-child immunity would bar claims by a child against his father's em-
ployer.1 54  The court relied on Small for the law on parent-child
immunity: "Chief Justice Stacy, writing the opinion for the Court, laid
down the rule that an unemancipated minor child living as a member of
the family may not maintain an action against the father for tort (includ-
ing negligent injury)."1 ' The explicit inclusion of negligent torts in such
150. 185 N.C. 577, 579, 118 S.E. 12, 12-13 (1923). See supra notes 63-71 and accompany-
ing text.
151. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905); see supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
153. Holt, 332 N.C. at 98, 418 S.E.2d at 515 (Meyer, J., concurring in result). This is in
contradistinction to the holding of the majority of the court in Holt: "[S]ince our decision in
Small, this Court has consistently applied the rule enunciated in that case; 'an unemancipated
minor child may not maintain an action based on ordinary negligence against his parents.'"
Id. at 93, 418 S.E.2d at 512 (quoting Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 316 N.C. 489, 491, 342 S.E.2d
882, 884 (1986)).
154. 229 N.C. 503, 507, 50 S.E.2d 540, 543 (1948); see supra notes 72-77 and accompany-
ing text.
155. Wright, 299 N.C. at 507, 50 S.E.2d at 543.
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a manner clearly indicates that the doctrine covers negligence in addition
to intentional torts.
Furthermore, in 1966, a commentator stated: "Parent-child suits
... are not permitted when the action is based on a personal injury,
whether such injury was caused by negligence or by a willful or malicious
act." 6 The North Carolina Family Law Practice Handbook states that
statutory and judicial exceptions to the doctrine were very limited and
"parents may still be immune from suit by a child for intentional torts
like assault, battery, false imprisonment and the like even when the tor-
tious behavior involves elements of moral turpitude." '15 7 Moreover,
although North Carolina courts often cite Professor Robert Lee's North
Carolina Family Law for the proposition that the parent-child immunity
doctrine does not bar personal injury suits based on willful and malicious
acts, Lee acknowledges that this conclusion derives solely from infer-
ences in opinions that indicate recovery might be allowed if the act was
willful and malicious.15 In a discussion about the possibility of North
Carolina courts adopting an exception for willful and malicious acts-
which had been done for the first time in 1950 by the Supreme Court of
Oregonllg-a North Carolina writer stated: "The North Carolina
Supreme Court adopted the general rule of nonliability in Small v. Morri-
son. )1 60 It is illustrative to note, finally, that the majority in Holt re-
sorted to citing a 1986 case, Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., for its version of the
doctrine that it purported was enunciated in Small.
The majority's inquiry into the willful and malicious nature of the
father's acts in Holt lends credence to Justice Meyer's assertion that, by
its decision, the majority created an exception to the doctrine of parent-
child tort immunity for willful and malicious acts-otherwise, the major-
ity simply could have held that since this was not ordinary negligence,
the doctrine did not apply. 161 A narrow holding crafting an exception to
the doctrine of parent-child immunity in cases of sexual abuse would
have limited the court's ruling, allaying any fear of subsequent suits
against parents for reasonable chastisement. 162 Furthermore, since an
objective survey of judicial precedent supports Justice Meyer's assertion
156. Thomas J. Bolch, Torts-Parent-Child Immunity, 44 N.C. L. REV. 1169, 1171-72
(1966). Bolch noted that in a number of opinions the court expressed a desire to join a nation-
wide trend of allowing such actions. Id at 1172 n.15.
157. THE NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE HANDBOOK 456 (1984).
158. 3 ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 248, at 299 (4th ed. 1981).
159. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 301, 218 P.2d 445, 453 (1950).
160. Earl W. Vaughn, Torts--Liability of Parent for Willful Injury to Child, 29 N.C. L.
REv. 214, 216 (1951).
161. Holt, 332 N.C. at 98, 418 S.E.2d at 516 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
162. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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that the bench and bar believed that Small v. Morrison barred suits in-
volving intentional torts as well as negligence, it was improper for the
supreme court to construe the Small decision to bar only suits involving
ordinary negligence. An express exception for willful and malicious acts
or acts of sexual abuse, overruling a portion of the Small holding, would
have been a more honest approach for the judiciary to take in deciding
Holt even though it would have involved overt judicial legislation. 63
The court clearly has requested that the legislature assess the public
policies supporting the doctrine and modify or abolish the immunity as it
deems appropriate.' Moreover, there are arguments that the legislature
is indeed the more appropriate body to make this determination: "A
declaration of public policy in this area should preferably be made by the
General Assembly.... [Legislation can] defin[e] the areas to be affected
within appropriate limitations, and not piecemeal by this court in the
peculiar circumstances of a given case."' 65 It seems logical that the role
of the legislature should be to make the laws of the state since it is a
representative body. 166 Finally, it has also been suggested that enacting a
statute is a simpler way to change a body of law.167 This Note urges the
General Assembly to use its authority either to abolish the doctrine of
parent-child immunity or, at a minimum, to make a plain statement of its
intent to retain the doctrine, thus clarifying the effect of Holt.161 Three
163. The court could have avoided the stigma it associates with what it terms "impermissi-
ble judicial legislation." See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Modification or abolition
of the doctrine, contributing to its overall decline throughout this country, "illustrates very
well the orthodox process of judicial legislation by exception, elaboration and interpretation."
Akers & Drummond, supra note 49, at 217. Furthermore, "the courts in this State have the
authority and obligation to modify or abolish inequitable and outdated judicial doctrines when
the need arises .... [Miost states that have abolished parental immunity have done so by court
decision, not by statute." Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 559-60, 564-65, 334
S.E.2d 250, 252-53, 255 (1985) (Becton, J., dissenting); see also Bolch, supra note 156, at 1177
("[I]t should be remembered that the immunity was a creature of the courts, and what the
courts created they can destroy.").
164. See supra notes 101 and 128 and accompanying text.
165. Castellucci v. Castellucci, 96 R.I. 34, 38, 188 A.2d 467, 469 (1963), cited in Skinner v.
Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 484, 189 S.E.2d 230, 235 (1972).
166. More importantly, the North Carolina Constitution gives the General Assembly the
power to grant or deny immunity. Dixon v. Peters, 63 N.C. App. 592, 597, 306 S.E.2d 477,
480 (1983), cited in Allen v. Allen, 76 N.C. App. 504, 506, 333 S.E.2d 530, 532 (1985).
167. 3 LEE, supra note 158, § 248, at 299.
168. The United States Supreme Court observed the importance of the legislature's deliver-
ing a plain statement of its intent in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991): "'In tradi-
tionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of
clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue,
the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.'" Id. at 2401 (quoting United States v.
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)). A plain statement must be "'unmistakably clear in the lan-
guage of the statute."' Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
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interests require balancing as the legislature reevaluates the public poli-
cies supporting the doctrine of parent-child immunity: "those of the par-
ent in raising his child, of the child in compensation for his injuries, and
of society in preserving the family structure." 169
Courts and legislatures abolishing the doctrine have adopted one of
three alternatives in place of parent-child immunity. First, in Goller v.
White, 170 the Wisconsin Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine with two
exceptions: "(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of
parental authority over the child; 7 1 and (2) where the alleged negligent
act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to
the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and
other care." '72 Where these exceptions do not apply, the reasonableness
standard applies to the parent's actions. 173
Another alternative is the reasonable parent standard: "[W]hat
would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar
circumstances?" '174 The parent, under this standard, retains some leeway
in raising the child, the child has a right to recover for unreasonable
injuries, and the public policies of family harmony, fraud, and collusion,
as well as the preservation of parental authority, are preserved.175 Courts
are familiar with applying reasonableness standards, and the court
should continue to assess traditional considerations such as the child's
capacity and intelligence and exceptional circumstances in determina-
tions of reasonableness. 176
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts urges complete abroga-
tion of the doctrine of parent-child immunity: "A parent or child is not
immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relation-
(1985)). The legislature should strive to declare its intention in "straightfolard and unequiv-
ocal language." Hatcher v. Rose, 97 N.C. App. 652, 655, 389 S.E.2d 442, 444 (1990).
169. "Reasonable Parent," supra note 49, at 805.
170. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
171. This exception provides immunity in the area of parental discipline. "Reasonable Par-
ent," supra note 49, at 806.
172. Goller, 20 Wis. 2d at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198. The second exception provides immu-
nity in the parent's performance of legal duties. "Reasonable Parent," supra note 49, at 806.
173. "Reasonable Parent," supra note 49, at 807. For an in-depth discussion of the pros
and cons of this alternative, see Hollister, supra note 49, at 512-16.
174. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293
(1971).
175. "Reasonable Parent," supra note 49, at 808-09.
176. a d at 810. The major drawback of this approach is that it assumes courts will be
sensitive enough to account for "different economic, educational, cultural, ethnic and religious
backgrounds." Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 50, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d
859, 871 (1974).
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ship.'" 17 7 The reasonable, prudent parent standard should be imposed by
the courts, the Restatement posits, but only in light of the need for paren-
tal discretion, "to require that the conduct be palpably unreasonable in
order to impose liability." 178 The Restatement provides guidelines to aid
courts and legislatures in determining what is reasonable. 179
There is another option, however, which is ideal for North Carolina
but has not yet been proposed. An inquiry most effectively demonstrates
this alternative. If the doctrine were abolished by the legislature to-
morrow, what would be the state of the law in North Carolina? Would
existing constitutional, statutory, and case law be adequate to fill in the
void? This Note asserts that parents and children in North Carolina
would have adequate recourse and protection.
The United States Constitution provides some basic protections for
the parent-child relationship. 1 0 Freedom of choice in the area of family
life is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. ' "'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hin-
der.' "182 Because of the special role the family plays in our country,
constitutional principles are "applied with sensitivity and flexibility to
the special needs of parents and children."' 83
The North Carolina Constitution provides additional protection for
the child: "All courts shall be open; every person for an injury done him
in his.., person.., shall have remedy by due course of law; and right
and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay."' 84
This provision, it has been asserted, "mandates that children should have
a remedy against their negligent parents."' 85
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(I) (1977).
178. Id. § 895G cmt. k.
179. Id.
180. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
181. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
182. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944));
see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). The Baird Court stated:
[D]eeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the parental
role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "consti-
tutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to author-
ity in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society."
Id at 638 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968)).
183. Baird, 443 U.S. at 634.
184. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18.




Additionally, in North Carolina, the body of case law that has de-
veloped regarding civil liability of teachers for injuries sustained by their
students should be wholly applicable to parents, once the doctrine of par-
ent-child immunity is abolished, since teachers stand in loco parentis.186
One of the most sacred duties of parents, is to train up and
qualify their children, for becoming useful and virtuous mem-
bers of society; this duty cannot be effectually performed with-
out the ability to command obedience, to control stubbornness,
to quicken diligence, and to reform bad habits; and to enable
him to exercise this salutary sway, he is armed with the power
to administer moderate correction, when he shall believe it to
be just and necessary. The teacher is the substitute of the par-
ent; is charged in part with the performance of his duties, and
in the exercise of these delegated duties, is invested with his
power. 187
As case law developed through the early twentieth century, a test
developed to gauge when a pupil could recover damages from his teacher
for injuries. Recovery was allowed (1) if the injury was permanent and
the teacher, "in the light of the attending circumstances and in the exer-
cise of ordinary care, ought reasonably to have foreseen that a permanent
injury would be the natural and probable consequence of his act," or (2)
if the teacher was acting maliciously.188 This same standard is used to
assess a parent's criminal liability in North Carolina;.. 9 likewise, if the
parent-child immunity doctrine were abolished, such a standard could be
used to assess a parent's civil liability.190 Thus, if the parent-child immu-
nity doctrine were abolished, existing constitutional, case, and statutory
law still should provide adequate safeguards protecting the parents while
allowing the children to have adequate redress for their injuries.19 1
186. In loco parentis means "In the place of a parent . . . charged, factitiously, with a
parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 708.
187. State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 365, 365-66 (1837). N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 110-44.1 (1991) states: "[A]ny child under 18 years of age ... shall be subject to the supervi-
sion and control of his parents."
188. Drum v. Miller, 135 N.C. 204, 208, 47 S.E. 421, 425 (1904); see N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-390 (1991) (declaring that school personnel may use reasonable force); Gaspersohn v.
Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 75 N.C. App. 23, 27-28, 330 S.E.2d 489, 493 (1985).
189. 3 LEE, supra note 158, § 249, at 321; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517 (1989 &
Supp. 1991) (defining "abused juveniles" in the juvenile code); id. § 14-318.2 (1986 & Supp.
1991) (declaring child abuse a general misdemeanor); id. § 14-318.4 (1986 & Supp. 1991) (de-
claring child abuse a felony).
190. Protective custody would be available for children with temporary, but routine,
injuries.
191. In Hawkins v. Hawkins, 331 N.C. 743, 417 S.E.2d 447 (1992), a plaintiff bought suit
against her adoptive father for assault and battery. Id. at 744, 417 S.E.2d at 448. The defend-
ant had sexually abused the plaintiff from the time she was five and a half until she was four-
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This Note does not condemn the actions of the North Carolina
Supreme Court. If anything, it is commendable that our courts are
"alive to the demands of justice." '19 2 As Justice Meyer indicated, it
would seem unconscionable not to allow these girls to recover damages
for their physical and emotional pain." 3 Holt is a significant case for
both its substantive holding and for how it treated precedent. It remains
very unclear, however, how the holding of the court will be applied in the
future. 9 But in the future, there are other options.
Realizing that it is unlikely that the North Carolina courts will over-
turn past decisions requiring them to defer to the General Assembly on
this issue, the North Carolina General Assembly must react to the pleas
of the courts. The General Assembly should enact North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes Section 1-539.22, either to make a plain statement about the
viability of the parent-child immunity doctrine and the effect of Holt 19I
or to abolish all vestiges of the doctrine. 96 If the General Assembly
abolishes the doctrine, existing constitutional, statutory, and case law in
North Carolina will fill the remaining void adequately, thus protecting
the interests of parents, children, and society.1 97 This State should not
teen. Id. The action was allowed. Id. Presumably, the defendant did not plead parent-child
immunity as an affirmative defense. This case is important because it allowed the daughter to
recover $25,000 in punitive damages, even though no compensatory damages were awarded.
Id "The jury, as trier of fact, found that plaintiff had in fact established her cause of action for
assault and battery. Plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to recover at least nominal damages. This
entitlement is sufficient to support the award of punitive damages." Id. at 745, 417 S.E.2d at
449.
192. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (1962) (quoting
Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957)); see supra note 145.
193. Holt, 332 N.C. at 98, 418 S.E.2d at 515 (Meyer, J., concurring in result).
194. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
195. For instance, the statute could read:
§ 1-539.22. Parent-child immunity.
The relationship of parent and child shall bar only rights of action by a person or his
estate against his parent or child for wrongful death, personal injury, or property
damage based on ordinary negligence.
or
§ 1-539.22. Parent-child immunity.
The relationship of parent and child shall bar all rights of action by a person or his
estate against his parent or child for wrongful death, personal injury, or property
damage, except in cases involving sexual abuse. The standard of proof should be
raised in such a case to clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
196. For instance, the statute could read:
§ 1-539.22. Abolition of parent-child immunity.
The relationship of parent and child shall not bar the right of action by a person or
his estate against his parent or child for wrongful death, personal injury, or property
damage.
197. See supra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
1250 [Vol. 71
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION
remain the notable exception to the growing list of jurisdictions embrac-
ing the modem trend of limiting or abrogating the parental immunity
doctrine. 198
M. MEBANE RASH
198. See Lee v. Mowett Sales Co., 76 N.C. App. 556, 565, 334 S.E.2d 250, 256 (1985)
(Becton, J., dissenting).
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